ABSTRACT The Multi-authority attribute-based encryption (MA-ABE) scheme can provide fine-grained data access control in many management domains monitored by different authorities for the cloud storage system. However, existed schemes do not support the flexible management of authorities. So, we present a new dispersed multi-value MA-ABE scheme with mediated obfuscation (DMV-ABE-WMO). In this scheme, each of attribute authorities (AAs) works independently without any collaboration with other AAs. For a data user (DU), data owner (DO) individually creates ciphertext in each management domain and each attribute authority (AA) also individually generates a private key in each management domain, respectively. We use the mediated obfuscation (MO) model to embed a secret related to DU into all target components which are used to encrypt the plaintext. In MO model, an especial function program is coded into the form of a group element, which is obfuscated to make other participants know nothing about the inner program but can evaluate the value of the function program. Our scheme is based on multi-value access structure and is proved secure against chosen plaintext attack. Compared with the related schemes, our scheme is more suited for realizing the dynamic management in many domains.
I. INTRODUCTION
More and more dynamic managements are needed by organizations or applications in the cloud environment. In order to realize fine-grained access control of data on cloud, Sahai and Waters [1] presented attribute-based encryption (ABE), in which users' identities are determined by their attributes. A lot of ABE schemes [2] - [30] have been presented. In order to solve the trouble of centralized power for only one authority in ABE scheme, multi-authority ABE (MA-ABE) scheme [25] was put forward. A MA-ABE scheme includes some attribute authorities (AAs) and one central authority (CA). The users obtain corresponding decryption keys from multiple AAs respectively. In MA-ABE schemes [10] - [13] , [28] , the user's global identifier (GID) was used to generate the related secret keys. However, vicious
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Chien-Ming Chen. users have chance to collect decryption keys by illegitimate approach and launch collusion attack. Chase [25] uses CA to gather each randomized master key from each related authority (AA) by using a pseudorandom function − − → PRF(·). The randomized master key of AA is used to avoid generating the same private key for an attribute at different times. It needs some crucial collaboration to initialize the system. Lewko and Waters [15] provided a decentralized MA-ABE in which each AA had no master key and had poor autonomous and dynamic management of AAs. However, more and more organizations or applications need to be fit for working more flexibly. We hope the decryption key and ciphertext are independently generated in each corresponding attribute management domain. When one attribute management domain changes, only a few parts, even one part, of one existing ciphertext or decryption key need adjustment, other parts do not change. It is meaningful to do some research works in this field.
A. OUR MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION
We provided a new dispersed multi-value MA-ABE scheme with mediated obfuscation [49] (DMV-ABE-WMO) which works best for the situations needing to enhance the ability of decentralized management in MA-ABE schemes.
In order to highlight the independent management privilege of AAs, AAs in our scheme respectively create corresponding master keys in establishing the whole system. The related AAs can independently generate the corresponding parts of ciphertext for data owner (DO) and the corresponding parts of decryption key for data user (DU) respectively. However, our main technical hurdle is to avoid collusion attack launched by vicious users. Especially, some users who satisfy the access policies in different management domains respectively combine their secret keys together to realize collusion attack. How to bind all discrete master public keys provided by different authorities into target messages and unify all decryption keys related to one user are two challenging issues.
To address the collusion attack problem, a mediated obfuscation (MO) model is adopted where a believable mediator (MD) is employed. In our scheme, a pseudorandom function − − → PRF(·) is delivered to all AAs and MD secretly. For one user U with the global identifier (Gid), all AAs and MD can calculate a secret u which is used to bind and unify above discrete master public keys from different AAs.
In our MO model, a special functional encryption (FE) scheme is defined. Namely, a function program f (x 1 , x 2 ) is coded into an element of a multiplicative cyclic group G T .
Here f (x 1 , x 2 ) includes all discrete target parts of master public keys for AAs and a secret value ∂ from DO. A secret blind factor ξ ∈ Z p is randomly selected by DO and is used to generate the obfuscated function
and evaluate the obfuscated function by calling ( f (x 1 , x 2 )) ξ ·(u/ξ ) . By this way, we realize to use u to bind all dispersed target message parts and maintain the function of MA-ABE simultaneously.
B. ORGANIZATION
The related work is introduced in Section 2. The preliminaries are introduced in Section 3. In Section 4, a DMV-ABE-WMO scheme is proposed and it is proved to be secure in Section 5. Subsequently, we give the performance comparison between the scheme [15] and the proposed scheme in Section 6. We conclude our paper in Section 7.
II. RELATED WORK
ABE comprises two kinds of ABE, namely, ciphertextpolicy ABE (CP-ABE) and key-policy ABE (KP-ABE).
In CP-ABE, data owners encrypt data with the corresponding attributes' public keys based on one access structure of attributes. Access structure is embedded in the ciphertext, while the secret keys are produced according to the attribute set of data users. One user with the attributes satisfying the access structure in the ciphertext can decrypt the ciphertext [16] . In KP-ABE, the encryptor selects the related attributes to encrypt data. The authorities collect the corresponding combinations of attributes and determine which data users decrypt such data [17] - [18] . Many ABE schemes were presented in various application domains, such as ABE with outsourced data decryption [2] , [3] , [6] , ABE with efficient attribute revocation [5] , [7] , [11] , [13] , traceable ABE [8] , [29] , ABE with file hierarchy access control [14] , ABE with privacy preserving [9] , [20] , [22] , [23] , [30] , ABE with keyword search function [2] , collision avoidance ABE [5] , auditable ABE [4] etc. Recently, Li et al. presented a two-party attribute-based key agreement protocol [26] and two attribute based encryption schemes [24] , [27] resilient to continuous leakage, which can be applied in mobile social networks [31] , smart grid [32] , and cloud storage [33] , [34] . In order to alleviate the trust for the central authority, Chase [25] gave a multi-authority ABE (MA-ABE) scheme, in which each attribute authority issued secret key for a different set of attributes. This scheme supports some AAs and one central authority (CA), who grasps the master keys of all authorities. Each authority makes crucial collaboration with other authorities to initialize the system. Some MA-ABE schemes submit the user's Gid to each authority to get the related secret key. In order to strengthen the decentralized property, Lewko and Waters [15] presented a decentralized MA-ABE scheme where the access structure is constructed based on each related public attribute key. It has been proven secure by utilizing the dual system encryption technology. However, such scheme is lack of effective support for applications needing dynamic management when related AAs change. Han et al. [19] presented a decentralized CP-ABE (PPDCP-ABE) scheme with privacy-preserving. In their scheme, each authority works independently without any collaboration. The generation of corresponding chipertexts and decryption keys are independently accomplished in each attribute management domain. In order to achieve keyword search in ciphertext of cloud storage, some searchable public key encryption schemes [35] - [38] were proposed. Recently, some authentication protocols and key-insulated signature [39] - [41] were presented, which can be applied in RFID and IoT environments.
Lots of meaningful studies of program obfuscation (PO) realized in cryptography have been carried out in recent years. The purpose of PO is to make a program unrecognizable while maintaining its functionality. Ideally, an obfuscated program is a virtual black box (VBB). Some simple functions have been proved to be capable of being obfuscated, for example, point function [42] - [46] , multi-point function, hyperplane membership [47] - [48] , re-encryption function [49] , etc. However, Barak et al. [50] proved that the obfuscation of the universal function to achieve the perfect VBB security was impossible. If a one-way function exists, there exist unobfuscated functions. VOLUME 7, 2019 Some researches of obfuscation function were presented under the strong security assumption of VBB, such as the obfuscation possibility of point function and multi-point function [44] , [45] , the obfuscation possibility of general function and special function [44] , and the relationship between obfuscation and the probabilistic encryption [51] , security of black box features [52] , [53] , etc. VBB security is the ideal result in the obfuscation security requirements. Unfortunately, it is impossible to obfuscate the general programs in VBB security. The existing positive results for obfuscation require significant security compromises. A few obfuscation studies at different security levels were put forward, such as virtual grey box (VGB) obfuscation [54] , most possibility obfuscation [55] , indistinguishability obfuscation [43] , [56] , etc. A relaxed notion of obfuscation called mediated obfuscation (MO) based on functional encryption (FE) is given in [57] . To achieve fully secure obfuscation of arbitrary programs, mediated obfuscation uses a minimal amount of interaction with a semi-trusted third party. FE [58] is a kind of encryption which refines traditional ''all-ornothing'' pattern. It allows different users to hold unique secret keys which decrypt arbitrary functions of the plaintext. Safety obfuscation has many wide application prospects in cryptography.
III. PRELIMINARIES A. ACCESS STRUCTURE
Our scheme adopts and-gates on multi-value attributes access structure. Suppose there are N attribute authorities and n kinds of attributes. Let att i,δ represent the i th attribute in the attribute set AA δ monitored by the attribute authority AA δ . S att i,δ = {v i,1 , · · · , v i,n i } denotes the set of possible n i values for att i,δ . Suppose there is ζ authorities with AA δ U = ∅, where U is the attribute set of a user U and U = {v i,j |v i,j ∈ S att i, δ , δ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , ζ }}.
B. BILINEAR MAPS
G and G T are two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. g is a generator in G and there is a bilinear map e : G×G → G T . e satisfies the below properties:
(1) Bilinearity: for all η, σ ∈ Z p , e(g η , g σ ) = e(g, g) ησ .
(2) Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) = 1. [59] Assume that s, a, q ∈ Z p are randomly selected. e : G × G → G T is a bilinear map and g is a generator in G. Given a tuple
C. DECISIONAL Q-BILINEAR DIFFIE-HELLMAN EXPONENT (Q-BDHE) ASSUMPTION
·s and a random element R ∈ G T with the following advantage adv
where ε is a negligible function, then we state that the decisional q-BDHE assumption holds.
D. MEDIATED OBFUSCATION [57]
1) FUNCTIONAL ENCRYPTION [58] We define a functional encryption (FE) scheme as follows:
The scheme includes a function − → f : Msg × Key → {0, 1} * and four algorithms, where Key, Msg denote key space and message space respectively. Let
After being input security parameter 1 λ , the algorithm outputs a master public-private key pair (pub k , pri k ).
KeyGeneration(pri k , k) → sk k : After being input a master key pri k and a key k ∈ Key which is related to function − → f (·), the algorithm outputs a decryption key sk k .
Encryption(pub k , M ) → ct: After being input a public key pub k and plaintext M ∈ Msg, the algorithm outputs a ciphertext ct.
: After being input ct and sk k , the algorithm outputs a string
, the value of
2) PROGRAM OBFUSCATION [50] We say a program is obfuscated if the source code for the obfuscated program leaks no more information than that learned from oracle access to it. Definition 1 [50] : Let ς be a negligible function. An algorithm
is an obfuscation for the program of function − → f (·) if for all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversaries A there is an oracle PPT simulator S such that |Pr[
S descripts an idealized ''oracle'' that does nothing but accepts the input of − → f (·) and returns the function value
.
3) MEDIATED OBFUSCATION [57] Based on functional encryption, mediated obfuscation (MO) uses a limited amount of interaction to realize program obfuscation. As shown in FIGURE. 1, there are 3 roles, Data owner (DO), Data user (DU ) and Mediator (MD). In MO model, First, DO sends
to DU and a key pri k related to
to MD. Secondly, DU sends x to MD where x ∈ Key denotes a key of the identification of DU . Then MD generates sk k on received x and pri k and returns pri k to DU . Thirdly,
with sk k for evaluating and not revealing the 
E. THE OUTLINE OF DMV-ABE-WMO SCHEME
The DMV-ABE-WMO scheme consists of four types of roles, i.e., MD, AAs, DO, DU . Each attribute authority AA δ and the trusted MD are secretly issued pseudorandom function
At the same time, DO generates two secrets ∂, pri k and sends the secret key EnCryption(PP, { W δ } δ∈{1,2,··· ,ζ ] , M ) → CT , pri k . After being given a message M , the public parameter PP, an access structure { W δ } δ∈{1,2,··· ,ζ ] where ζ are supposed to be the number of attributes involved in the access structure, this algorithm outputs the ciphertext CT including an obfuscated function x 2 ) and the keys pri k which is related to
and is sent to MD secretly.
KeyGeneration(PP,
After being input the public parameter PP, a pseudoran-
fier Gid U , and U 's attribute set U , outputs U 's private key USK δ (δ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , ζ }), where ζ authorities are supposed to be involved in U 's attributes.
This algorithm is executed by MD. After being input the public parameter PP, a pseudorandom function − − → PRF(·), the master key pri k , U 's identity ID U , the algorithm outputs the key sk k which is sent to U by MD if the identity ID U is valid.
Decryption(PP, CT , USK χ , sk k ) → Mor⊥. After being given the secret keys USK χ , the public parameter PP, the ciphertext CT and the secret sk k , the algorithm outputs
F. SELECTIVE-FAILURE BLINDNESS
In the MO model of DMV-ABE-WMO scheme, selectivefailure blindness means that malicious clients fail to call Decryption algorithm selectively and successfully by disclosing the inner secret in the obfuscated program. DO randomly selects ξ ∈ Z p as an obfuscation factor and computes ( − → f (·)) ξ , which satisfies uniform distribution in G T . Since ξ is known only by DO and MD, no probabilistic polynomial-time malicious client calculates − → f (·) from ( − → f (·)) ξ to destroy the normal running of Decryption algorithm.
G. SECURITY MODEL OF DMV-ABE-WMO SCHEME
The security model of DMV-ABE-WMO scheme is described as below.
Setup: The challenger B executes GlobalSetup, AASetup algorithms and sends the public parameter PP to the attacker A. Then A declares a challenge access structure A * to B.
Phase 1: Given a user U with the global identifier Gid U and identity ID U , A adaptively queries secret keys corresponding to the attribute set U , which does not satisfy A * .
B returns USK δ (δ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , ζ }) to A according to KeyGeneration algorithm after successfully verifying the identity ID U . U applies for the key sk k when decrypting the challenge ciphertext. B returns sk k to the attacker according to Generation_sk k algorithm after successfully verifying the identity ID U .
Challenge: A sends two messages M 0 , M 1 with the same size to B, B builds a challenge ciphertext under the challenging access policy A * . Note that the access policy does not be matched by any attribute set which has being queried. B flips a random coin and obtains a bit τ ∈ {0, 1} and returns CT * of M τ as the challenge ciphertext to A by calling the algorithm EnCryption.
Phase 2: Same as Phase 1. Guess: A wins the game, if A outputs a guess τ , which is equal to τ selected by B.
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Definition 2: A DMV-ABE-WMO scheme is selectiveaccess policy secure if no PPT adversary A wins the above game at the advantage Adv
2 | > ε , where ε denotes the non-negligible probability.
Definition 3: We say that a DMV-ABE-WMO scheme is secure if the following properties hold:
(1) DMV-ABE-WMO scheme is secure against the selective access policy model;
(2) DMV-ABE-WMO has the obfuscation property.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
GlobalSetup: There is a bilinear map e : G × G → G T , where G and G T are two multiplicative cyclic groups with prime order p. g is a generator of G. This algorithm chooses a cryptographic hash function
There is a trusted mediator (MD). This algorithm also generates a pseudorandom function − − → PRF(GID) which inputs the global identifier GID. All attribute authorities and MD hold the pseudorandom function − − → PRF(·) secretly. The public parameter is PP = (g, e, 
p, G, G T , H 1 (·)).
AASetup: Each authority AA δ randomly selects α δ ∈ Z p as its master key and calculates e(g, g) 
as the private attribute key and computes the corresponding public attribute key P i,j = g −r i,j . AA δ publishes the set of public key PK δ = {e(g, g) α δ , {P i,j } v i,j ∈ AA δ } and keeps the private key set SK δ = {α δ ,
EnCryption: Suppose there is an access structure
, where ζ is the number of related authorities.
That is, for δ ∈ {1, 2,
When encrypting a message M ∈ G T , the data owner DO randomly selects ξ ∈ Z p , ∂ ∈ G T and generates C 0 = (1/∂) ξ · M . Then DO selects a random number s δ ∈ Z p for each AA δ . DO defines a function − → f : Msg × Key → G T , where Key, Msg denote the key space and the message space respectively. The concrete function is f (
is two variable parameters of the function f (·) and x 1 ∈ G T , x 2 ∈ Z p . DO computes δ = e(g, g) α δ s δ for AA δ . In order to achieve the mediated obfuscation of this function, DO blinds f (∂, x 2 ) into the obfuscated function
Finally, the ciphertext is
The algorithm finally sends the secret ξ related to
to MD safely.
KeyGeneration: For the user U with attribute set U , global identifier GID U , suppose there is ζ authorities with
The algorithm is an interactive procedure. DU submits U 's identity ID U and global identifier GID U to MD. If the identity ID U is valid, MD computes u = − − → PRF(GLD U ) and generates sk k = ξ/u and sends sk k to U . 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS

Theorem 1:
The DMV-ABE-WMO scheme is secure against the selective access structure model if decisional q-PBDHE assumption holds.
Proof: We show a simulator B is built to solve the decisional q-PBDHE difficult problem assumption by using the adversary A who breaks the DMV-ABE-WMO at nonnegligible probability ε in the selective security game.
Init: B takes in q-PBDHE challenge with a tuple (g, a, q, h = g s , Y ) . A provides the challenge access structure W * = {W * 1 , W * 2 , · · · , W * m }, where m = | W * | and Att I * = {i 1 , i 2 , · · · , i m } denotes the index set of attribute value in W * . One challenge attribute will be selected. Suppose that γ is randomly selected from {0, 1} and n δ * is the number of one user's attributes monitored by AA δ * that includes the challenge attribute. Assume T = e(g s , g) −n δ * ·a q+1 if γ = 1 and T is a random value in G T if γ = 0.
Setup: There exists a trusted mediator (MD) ( B). One pseudorandom function − − → PRF(·) is generated secretly and issued to each attribute authority. The public parameter is PP = (g, e, p, G, G T , H 1 (·)). n denotes the number of all attributes. k is an arbitrary attribute index and n att k,δ is the number of attribute value for attribute att k,δ . For att k,δ , B randomly chooses r i,j ∈ Z p as private attribute key for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ n att k,δ . I * denotes the set of index for attribute values in W * . For I * = {1, 2, · · · , m}, w ∈ I * , B randomly selects r i w ∈ Z p as the private attribute key for the corresponding attribute values in W * . B randomly selects a challenge index w * ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m} and the corresponding private attribute key r i w * ∈ Z p .
(1) For v i,j with i = w ∈ I * − {w * }, B produces the public attribute key as follows:
(2) For i = w = w * , B produces the public attribute key as follows:
(3) For i / ∈ I * , B produces the public attribute key P i,j = g −r i,j . Phase 1: Suppose a user U has a global identifier GID U and the corresponding attribute set U which does not satisfy W * and wants to query the secret key. B computes the secret u = − − → PRF(GID U ) and works as follows.
Suppose there is ς authorities such that AA δ U = ∅, δ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , ς }. AA δ denotes the attribute set of the attribute authority AA δ . Next, A queries a private key of user U with the attribute set U and a global name GID U , where U | = W * . Without loss of generality, we suppose one attribute value v w ,j in U does not satisfy W * . i w is the index of the attribute att w . B runs the random oracle H 1 (x) which is defined in a table . A submits GID U to B. If H 1 (GID U ) exits in the table then B simply responses with the previous value, otherwise B randomly chooses a value ι ∈ Z p and computes (2) For i = w , B calculates the private key as follows.
i,j is well formed as being shown in the following equation.
B randomly selects α δ ∈ Z p (or adopts the existed α δ of AA δ ) as the private key of
i,j is well formed as being shown in the following equation. B randomly chooses ∂ ∈ G T , ξ ∈ Z p and programs the
x 2 is the variable parameter which receives any values of Z p .
Finally, B computes.
Meanwhile, B sends ξ to MD( B). U ( A) decrypts the ciphertext by calling
Phase 2: Same as phase 1.
Guess: A outputs a guess for . B outputs 1 to guess that T = e(g s , g) −n δ * ·a q+1 if = ; Else, it outputs 0 to show that T is a random value in G T . B presents a complete simulation, thus we have
Therefore, B finally wins the decisional q-BDHE assumption at non-negligible advantage ε.
Theorem 2: DMV-ABE-WMO scheme has obfuscation property if the hardness of discrete logarithm holds.
Proof: In MO model, DO randomly selects ξ ∈ Z p as an obfuscation factor for − → f (∂, x 2 ). Then computes
So we states our DMV-ABE-WMO scheme has obfuscation property.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
Performance comparison between the schemes [15] and our scheme is presented in the following two tables. n A denotes the number of the index set of AAs involved in the generation of private keys or ciphertext. TE G T , TE G are exponentiation operation time in an element of group G T and group G, respectively. TP denotes the time of pairing operation. Let l W be the amount of the attributes in the access policy. l USK U is the amount of the attributes in the private key for the user U .
In general, once one authority in our scheme changes, all the information referred to the authority needs to be reproduced again. Suppose that l W AA ν is the amount of the attributes monitored by AA ν in access policy. l U AA ν is the amount of the attributes monitored by AA ν in the private key. In our scheme, only parts of the existed ciphertexts and decrypt keys related to AA ν need to be adjusted when the application domain monitored by AA ν is removed (or is added). The corresponding workloads of updating (or adding) ciphertexts and private keys are listed in TABLE 1, 2. (g (1/n ν )·α ν ·u · H 1 (GID U ) r i,j ) related to AA ν . So the ciphertext updating and the decryption key updating in our scheme don't cost exponentiation operation time or pairing operation time. Unfortunately the scheme [15] need to reproduce all ciphertexts when AA ν is removed. As shown in the TABLE 2, the proposed scheme has advantage in transforming the existed ciphertexts and decryption keys into new ciphertexts and decryption keys respectively when adding a new domain managed by AA ν .
B. EXPERIMENTAL SIMULATION
A simulation experiment is conducted on Windows 7 system with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 CPU at 2.3GHZ and 4GB RAM. The scheme is executed by using the pairing-based cryptography library(PBC) library [60] . We utilize a symmetric elliptic curve a-curve with 160-bit group order, in which the base field size is 512-bit. To compare above schemes in practical operation, we execute corresponding algorithms ten times respectively and computes the average value. All the algorithms are coded by utilizing c language under the default case that each scheme includes 20 attributes authorities and 100 attributes in access policy. In addition, suppose the number l W AA ν (or l U AA ν ) monitored by AA ν is 5. The running results are shown in FIGURE 2-3, from which we note that the performance of our scheme is better than that of other schemes overall. Especially, the proposed scheme has obvious advantage in dynamic management. The theoretical analysis has the same result as that of simulation analysis.
VII. CONCLUSION
Our scheme realized the dispersed management in andgates on multi-value attributes access structure. The frequent changes of AAs in practical application only need minor adjustment for original cipthertexts and keys. VOLUME 7, 2019 The mediated obfuscation (MO) is well applied to the concrete DMV-ABE-WMO scheme. How to weaken the requirement of the fully trusted MD and build a DMV-ABE-WMO scheme which has no predetermined secret − − → PRF(·) are our further research works.
